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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Whether a defendant owns an interest in the land is 
irrelevant in determining liability under the 1987 contractor's 
bond statute. Rather, liability depends on whether the defendant 
contracted for the construction, alteration, or repair of a 
building, structure, or improvement on land. Since the placement 
of telecommunications cable beneath a public street does not 
constitute an improvement on land, there is no liability under the 
statute. In any event, U S WEST Communications did not own an 
interest in the land, since its only right to place the cable 
arose through a revocable license. 
2. The contractor's bond statute does not apply unless the 
labor and materials add value to the real property where they are 
furnished. Since it is undisputed that the installation of 
telecommunications cable beneath the street did not add value to 
the real property, the statute does not apply in this case. The 
fact that U S WEST Communications may have received a benefit from 
the cable is insufficient to invoke application of the statute. 
3. The contractor's bond statute does not apply unless the 
labor and materials relate to the construction, alteration, or 
repair of real property. The telecommunications cable is personal 
property, because it was installed under a license on real 
property in which U S WEST Communications held no interest, it did 
not benefit the real property, U S WEST Communications retained 
the right to remove it, and there was no evidence of an intent to 
make the cable a part of the realty. 
4. Dalton is not entitled to prejudgment interest because 
the damages represented the reasonable value of the labor and 
materials, which could not be determined by the use of fixed rules 
of evidence and known standards of value• 
ARGUMENT 
Dalton totally ignores U S WEST Communications' principal 
argument, that it cannot be an "owner" under the contractor's bond 
statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 14-2-1 et seq., because the underground 
telephone cable is not an improvement upon land, since it was not 
installed as an integral part of the construction, alteration, or 
repair of a building or structure. (See Appellant's Brief at 5-
11.) Rather, Dalton focuses on U S WEST Communications' 
subsidiary arguments, that the cable does not add value to the 
land (Appellant's Brief at 11-13), and that it is personalty, not 
realty (Appellant's Brief at 13-14). Furthermore, he clings to 
the erroneous and irrelevant notion that because U S WEST 
Communications had a permit from South Salt Lake City to place 
cable underneath a public street, it had an "interest in land," 
thereby permitting application of the contractor's bond statute. 
All of Dalton's arguments lack merit, as the following will 
demonstrate. 
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I." WHETHER U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS OWNED AN INTEREST IN THE 
PUBLIC ROAD IS IRRELEVANT IN DETERMINING LIABILITY UNDER THE 
CONTRACTORS BOND STATUTE. 
Dalton devotes the majority of his brief to an argument that 
U S WEST Communications owned a lienable interest in the public 
road, and that therefore U S WEST Communications is liable under 
the contractor's bond statute. Both the premise and the 
conclusion are incorrect. 
U S WEST Communications agrees that interests in real 
property less than fee may be subject to mechanic's liens.1 
However, Dalton fails properly to distinguish between interests in 
real property less than fee, such as a lease or easement, and non-
interests in real property, such as a license. In Kuhlman v. 
Rivera, 701 P.2d 982 (Mont. 1985), the court distinguished between 
an easement, which is a non-possessory interest in land, and a 
license, stating that "a license is not an interest; a license is 
merely a privilege to do some act on the land without possessing 
an interest in the land." 701 P.2d at 985. 
In the present case, Dalton failed to establish that U S WEST 
Communications had anything more than a license to place cable 
beneath the public street, in the form of a revocable excavation 
permit from South Salt Lake City. That the permit was written 
1
 For example, a lessee's leasehold interest is lienable, 
Buehner Block Company v. Glezos. 6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d 517, 520 
(1957), although an owner's interest may not be subject to a 
mechanic's lien for labor and materials supplied to a sublessee, 
Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Navalco, 648 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1982). 
See also, Allen Steel Co. v. Crossroads Plaza Associates, 119 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 6, 13-14 (UtahApp., filed Oct. 6, 1989). 
3 
does not elevate its status above a license, since a license can 
be created by either written or spoken words. Von Pollen v. 
Stulgies, 177 Neb. 5, 128 N.W.2d 115, 118 (1964). Dalton 
acknowledges that there are no cases holding that a license is an 
interest in land justifying application of the contractor's bond 
statute. (Respondent's Brief at 9) 
Even assuming, arguendo, that U S WEST Communications' permit 
constituted a lienable interest in land,2 Dalton's argument still 
leads nowhere, because liability under the contractor's bond 
statute does not depend at all on whether a defendant has an 
interest in the land. Rather, the critical question is whether 
the defendant is an "owner," which is defined in the statute as 
"any person contracting for construction, alteration9 or repair of 
any building, structure, or improvement upon land." Utah Code 
Ann. § 14-2-1 (1987).3 Thus, the issue in this case is not 
whether U S WEST Communications owned an interest in the public 
2
 The lower court specifically held that Dalton had no cause 
of action under the mechanic's lien law. That ruling was not 
appealed. 
3
 Dalton's confusion may stem from the fact that the 
predecessor to the 1987 version of the contractor's bond statute 
imposed liability upon "[t]he owner of any interest in land 
entering into a contract . . . for the construction, addition to, 
alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or improvement 
upon land . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-1 (1986). However, 
under a well recognized principle of statutory construction, the 
omission of the phrase "any interest in land" in the 1987 version 
implies a legislative intent to abandon that element of liability. 
See 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 52.01 at 291 
(4th ed. 1973) ("[If] words used in a prior statute to express a 
certain meaning are omitted, it will be presumed that a change of 
meaning was intended.") 
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street, but whether the laying of cable beneath the street was an 
"improvement upon land" within the meaning of the statute. 
Unfortunately, Dalton did not even address this issue, implying a 
concession of U S WEST Communications' principal argument, that 
because the cable was not installed as an integral part of a 
building or structure, it was not an "improvement upon land." 
II. THE CABLE DOES NOT ADD ANY VALUE TO THE REAL PROPERTY. 
Dalton correctly notes that the purpose of the contractor's 
bond statute is "to protect laborers and materialmen who have 
added directly to the value of the property by performing labor or 
furnishing materials." Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Utah 
App. 1987) (emphasis added). The implication of that statement is 
that when the labor and materials do not add to the value of the 
property, the contractors bond statute does not apply. See 
Daniels v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 771 P.2d 1100 
(Utah App. 1989); Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1988). 
Dalton never offered any evidence that the telephone cable 
added value to the property; indeed, Dalton concedes that it did 
not add value. (Respondent's Brief at 10) Instead, Dalton argues 
that because it was valuable to U S WEST Communications to have 
the cable installed, the statute should apply. In so arguing, 
Dalton is attempting to revive his failed claim of unjust 
enrichment, which the trial court properly rejected. Dalton's 
emphasis on preventing U S WEST Communications from receiving the 
benefit of the work without paying for it ignores the undisputed 
5 
fact that U S WEST Communications paid for the work in the full 
amount of its obligation. Dalton is simply seeking to have U S 
WEST Communications pay a second time for the same work. 
III. THE UNDERGROUND CABLE IS PERSONALTY, NOT REALTY. 
The contractor's bond statute does not apply unless the labor 
and materials relate to the construction, alteration, or repair of 
real property. King Bros.. Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Co., 13 Utah 2d 
339, 374 P.2d 254, 256 (1962). Dalton wrongly assumes that 
burying an object that would otherwise be personalty converts it 
ipso facto into realty. If the telephone cable were hung from 
telephone poles rather than buried under the ground, there would 
be no question as to its status as personalty. See, e.g., Cuivre 
River Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. State Tax Commission. 769 
S.W.2d 431 (Mo. 1989); Southwestern Public Service Co. v. Chaves 
County, 85 N.M. 313, 512 P.2d 73, 79 (1973). 
Utah has applied the law of fixtures to determine when 
materials become part of the realty. King Bros.. 374 P.2d at 256. 
The law is well established that when a building or other 
improvement is erected under a license, it "does not become a 
fixture but remains the personal property of the annexer." 35 Am. 
Jur. 2d Fixtures § 80. See Workman v. Henrie, 266 P. 1033, 1035 
(Utah 1928). Furthermore, 
in the absence of any other facts or circumstances tending to 
show a different intention, it is generally considered that 
where the landowner consents to the placing of a building on 
his land by another without an express agreement as to 
whether it shall become a part of the realty or remain 
personalty, an agreement will be implied that such building 
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is to continue personal property, where such an agreement: is 
implied, it is immaterial what is the purpose, size, 
material, CI>II : mode of construction of the building. 
3 5 Am. d Fixtures § 80. If that principle applies t~ 
tin i:i ] d. I -,.. fortiori to utility facilities, such as 
telephone cable, that <JJ ^  installed pursuant to an excava t i 
permit. 
-J-^>ZJ.- y.jt -^ -^ . ..^ewei .s ii=»iL±LiiP,> -Jir . liberty Lake 
Utilities Company, Inc. , - * ^! < - •> < 
(1984), the court held that water mains installed by \ itility 
I J • • the 
personal property me ut ,nty compan . \H S , . :. stated that 
"whe : person with interest * and affixes v trti e 
that intends tc reserve title - :JV chattel himsel r :-.> 
P.2a -• ! . 
11 : , Northern Natural Gas Co, v Board of Equalization 
Neb. 806, 443 N.W 2d 249, 257-59 (1989), the court held that 
buried natural gas pipelines were personalty, not fixtures, for 
t a x p i, i r. p o s (•  \ i •>, b U t .: a 11;,»i» 1, 11 t,»i t,, » w. t:,;. 11 i,,» . 11 11 i,; e m e n I; b e t. w»:;" t,j 11 I II i < < <*i 11 e r s o f 
the pipeline and the fee owner that the pipe was to become an 
accession to the realty, ml could be removed without significant 
d a m a g e » I I! I n m ! i n I l i e pi i !:: „ appr opi: i a ted tc: the i ise 
of that part ot the realty with which ;r vas connected, it did not 
add value to the land, anu uie pi peline company intended that it 
remain personalty. 
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Other courts have reached similar conclusions regarding 
buried utility facilities, E.g., Southwestern Public Service Co. 
v. Chaves County, 85 N.M. 313, 512 P.2d 73, 79 (1973); Sulphur 
Springs Valley Elec. Co-op, Inc. v. Citv of Tombstone, 1 Ariz App. 
268, 401 P.2d 753, 758 (1965); Yellowstone Pipe Line Co. v. State 
Board of Equalization, 138 Mont. 603, 358 P.2d 55, 67-69 (1960), 
cert, denied, 366 U.S. 917 (1961). See also, Manhattan Cable 
Television, Inc. v. New York State Tax Commission, 137 A.D.2d 925, 
524 N.Y.S.2d 889 (N.Y. 1988) (cable television cable and equipment 
installed under city streets). 
In the present case, the telephone cable was installed under 
a public road in which U S WEST Communications held no interest. 
As in Liberty, the purpose of installing the cable "was not to 
benefit the abutting property but to extend and enhance" U S WEST 
Communications' telephone system. Liberty, 683 P.2d at 1121. U S 
WEST Communications continues to own the cable and may repair or 
remove it at its option. Dalton introduced no evidence to show 
any intention by U S WEST Communications to make the cable a part 
of the realty.4 
Metals Manufacturing Co. v. Bank of Commerce, 16 Utah 2d 74, 
395 P.2d 914 (1964), cited by Dalton, is distinguishable from the 
present case. In Metals, the court held that a landlord and a 
tenant could not, by agreement between themselves, declare real 
4
 The intention of the annexer is of prime importance in 
determining when personalty becomes a fixture. See Workman v. 
Henrie, 266 P. 1033, 1035 (Utah 1928). 
8 
property t.n lhn:-" personalty I n order to 'ivoid liability under the 
contractor's bond statute to a tliini J M M . y WIHJ uupp i i.e.u custom 
designed railings and gates for the leased space. 395 P.2d at 
91- e f • «• • S WEST Communications does not seek 
tc. rel> - - ^rtif.cid. agreement that the cable was personalty, 
where it would otherwise be considered realty. Rather, the cable 
:i s persoricj I ty IMMI iiubntanon because (I) it was not custom designed 
for a particular building; (2) it was placed on real property in 
which U S WEST Communications held no interest; (3) U S WEST 
Commun i ca tioi is " remove i t; ( ii 
does not benefit t::e owner of the real property, South Salt Lake 
City; and r'~ •* not appropriated * the use ;: the property as 
must t.;e concluded that the cable ; ; personalty, and that i/:*-
contractor's bond statute has no application. 
IVii T H E • L 0 W E R C 0 D R T ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DAMAGES WERE 
LIQUIDATED, JUSTIFYING PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
irgues that because the trial court found that the 
damages were liquidated, prejudgment • - 'rrvsl is jusLii mil. "!"h i s 
argument begs the question ~ ve issue ,..„, whether prejudgment 
interest appropriate when ne damages represent the reasonable 
value . : . :•.. ^ ri -. 
o
 D a l t o n S Ugg e sts that the damages awarded are liquidated 
because they represented the contract price of his work. 
(Respondent's Brief at 12) This argument is misleading, because U 
S WEST Communications did not have a direct contract with Dalton, 
and because damages under Utah Code Ann, § 14-2-2 (1937) are not 
9 
In Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, 123 
Utah Adv. Rep 37, 41 (Utah App*, filed December 14, 1989), this 
Court denied prejudgment interest, rejecting an argument that 
damages based on expert appraisals of fair market value were 
liquidated because the damages were complete and the loss was 
fixed as of a specific date. Quoting Fell, v. Union Pacific Ry. 
Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 1007 (1907), the Court stated: 
For damages to be calculable with mathematical certainty, 
they must be ascertained 
in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known 
standards of value, which the court or jury must follow 
in fixing the amount, rather than be guided by their 
best judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed for 
past as well as for future injury, or for elements that 
cannot be measured by any fixed standards of value. 
In another recent case, Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 
P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court denied 
prejudgment interest on lost profits damages. The Court observed: 
It is, of course, axiomatic that all claims can be reduced 
eventually to monetary value. All claims would therefore at 
some point become liquidated and theoretically subject to 
prejudgment interest claims. Common sense precludes such an 
interpretation, however. 
In the present case, Dalton is attempting to do exactly what the 
Utah Supreme Court said is inappropriate, that is, to claim 
prejudgment interest simply because the trier of fact eventually 
established the amount of damages. There are no "fixed rules of 
evidence and known standards of value," Fell, 88 P. at 1007, by 
which to determine the reasonable value of labor and materials 
measured by a contract price, but by reasonable value. 
10 
fun'rushed n instruction project UP nee it was error ::. the 
court to award prejudgment interest ui t h i r, ca 
CONCLDSION 
Dalton's brief does not raise any arguments, cite any 
of the judgment i n t:h a s 
case, "The trial court erred .^  concluding that the contractor J s 
bond statute applied, because the installation of 
tel eeoimuu '.'fit in whicn L <EST 
Communications owns no interest i s i lot an improvement upon ..di-
does not sdd value tn the land, and is not realty Therefore, the 
deci . . 
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